Bargaining with Two-Person-Groups—How Significant are Patient Partners
Oliver Kirchkamp and Ulrike Vollstädt
Although many real bargaining situations involve more than one person on each side of the bargaining table, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on two single players. We study a simple extension: Bilateral bargaining of four people (two two-person groups) with different patience. One might think that the outcome should depend only on the most patient members of each group. The impatient members agree anyway and are, hence, irrelevant. We find, however, that the less patient player has at least some impact on the outcome. As an explanation we suggest a decrease in uncertainty about responder behaviour if a group is clearly asymmetric.JEL-Classification: C78, D74
Keywords: bargaining experiment, heterogeneous group members
- An earlier version of the paper as available as Jena Economic Research Paper 2012-43.
- The paper is also availabe as CESifo Working Paper No. 4150.
- Here is the most recent version of the paper as of 29. December 2013, the data, and the R code we used to obtain tables and figures.
- On December 30, 2013, the paper has been accepted for publication at the Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization. The paper appeared 2014 in Volume 108, pp. 433-441.